Knowledge Spillover and Accounting Firms’ Competitive Strength in the M&A Advisory Market by Bilinski, P. & Yim, A.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Bilinski, P. ORCID: 0000-0002-0499-6429 and Yim, A. ORCID: 0000-0002-8063-
6572 (2018). Knowledge Spillover and Accounting Firms’ Competitive Strength in the M&A 
Advisory Market (Report No. 10.2139/ssrn.2695819). . 
This is the draft version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/21011/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2695819
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
  
 
Knowledge Spillover and Accounting Firms’ Competitive 
Strength in the M&A Advisory Market 
 
Pawel Bilinski, Cass Business School, City, University of London† 
Andrew Yim, Cass Business School, City, University of London‡  
 
23 September 2018 
 
 
 
Abstract. Accounting firms participating in M&A advisory teams can leverage their 
knowledge accumulated through assurance services to give the teams a competitive advantage 
in advising on transactions with hard-to-value targets. Consistently, we document that bidders 
are more likely to select accounting firms to advise on transactions involving such targets. 
Knowledge spillover aids in estimating the target’s value, which translates into higher service 
quality offered by accounting firms as captured by higher acquirer announcement-period stock 
returns and lower likelihood of overpaying for the target. The effects we document are 
concentrated in cases when the accounting firm is the audit-specialist in the target’s industry or 
target’s auditor and the target has low reporting quality. Our results help explain why Thomson 
Reuters ranks accounting firms among top global advisors, particularly in the mid- and low-end 
M&A advisory market. (JEL G34, M41, M49)  
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1. Introduction  
Accounting firms, besides audit, provide a variety of non-audit services including advisory 
services on mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Despite a rich literature focusing on various aspects 
of audit, no study to date examined advisory quality and the competitive strength of accounting 
firms in the M&A market. Two reasons merit this investigation. First, M&A advisory is one of the 
fastest and most lucrative business segments of accounting firms. Indap (2015) reports that “[a]s 
new opportunities in traditional audit and tax work have reached a plateau, the Big Four have turned 
to management consulting and mergers and acquisitions for growth.”. Restrictions on audit 
provision and forced rotations mean limited growth potential in the audit, but not in the advisory 
market. Noonan (2016) highlights high margins for M&A advisory services making this segment 
particularly attractive for accounting firms. 
Second, prior studies document that bidders frequently overpay for targets, particularly of low 
accounting quality, and that even hiring reputable investment banks does not mitigate the 
overpayment risk.1 It is thus interesting to know whether accounting firms can reduce this risk given 
that overpayment for targets is among the main reasons for the frequent failure of M&A transactions 
to generate benefits to acquirers’ shareholders.2 We propose that accounting expertise and skills 
acquired through assurance work can spill over to enhance the quality of accounting firms’ M&A 
advisory services, such as valuation fairness.3 Accounting knowledge spillover will be particularly 
important in reducing valuation uncertainty associated with low-accounting-quality targets. 
Knowledge spillover from audit engagements is a competitive strength of accounting firms that can 
                                                 
1 For bidders’ overpayment for targets, see Gu and Lev (2011), Mauboussin (2010), Raman, Shivakumar, and Tamayo 
(2013), and Marquardt and Zur (2015). For reputable investment banks’ inability to mitigate the overpayment risk, see 
Servaes and Zenner (1996), Rau (2000), Porrini (2006), McLaughlin (1992), Hunter and Jagtiani (2003), and Ismail 
(2010).  
2  See Mauboussin (2010), Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002), Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2003), and 
McNamara, Haleblain, and Dykes (2008). 
3 We do not preclude knowledge spillover from non-audit functions to M&A advisory services. However, given the 
size, market penetration and importance of the audit function, we expect audit to generate a significant proportion of 
accounting knowledge that could be helpful in M&A.  
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help them compete for M&A advisory roles.   
We focus on target’s accounting quality—the precision with which financial reports convey 
information about the firm's economic position and performance (Callen, Khan, and Lu 2013)—
since target’s valuation is ultimately based on accounting measures (Mukherjee, Kiymaz, and Baker 
2004). Prior research documents that bidders pay higher premiums for targets with low accounting 
quality (Raman, Shivakumar, and Tamayo 2013; Marquardt and Zur 2015) and that the acquisitions 
of these targets generate lower acquirer announcement returns (McNichols and Stubben 2015). 
Accounting firms’ specialty in financial reporting and their expert understanding of private and 
public firms’ financials gleaned from audit and other engagements should facilitate translating low-
quality accounting numbers into fair valuations. To support the knowledge spillover hypothesis, we 
focus on cases where accounting firms are also audit specialists of low-accounting-quality industries 
(industry-expertise spillover) as audit-generated accounting knowledge is most relevant to the 
valuation task in these cases. To corroborate the evidence on the industry-expertise knowledge 
spillover, we also examine instances where the accounting firm is the target’s auditor, which 
facilitates firm-specific information spillover (target-expertise spillover). 
Our sample includes global M&A transactions between 1990‒2014 with listed acquirers 
domiciled in fifteen Europe countries. We focus on Europe as three of the Big Four divested their 
advisory and consulting practices in the US after the SOX was enacted (Harris 2014). In contrast, 
no regulation prohibits accounting firms from offering advisory services to audit and non-audit 
clients in Europe during our sample period.4 Over this period, accounting firms competed with 164 
top and boutique investment banks with their market share, measured by deal count, increasing from 
less than 1% in early 1990’s to almost 27% in 2013 (see Figure 1). For comparison, J.P. Morgan 
                                                 
4 According to the FAQ document on the EU Audit Legislation produced by the European Contact Group (ECG), which 
is an informal regulatory and policy working group of six large audit networks in the EU (BDO, Deloitte, EY, Grant 
Thornton, KPMG and PwC), valuations and accounting consultations and audits in connection with acquisitions, which 
are corporate finance services traditionally performed by the auditors, are considered permissible even after the EU 
Audit Reform in 2016 (see p. 64 of the February 2018 edition of the ECG FAQs). 
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advised on 2.8% and Goldman Sachs on 2.7% of transactions. Accounting firms are more active in 
the mid- and low-end market of M&A advisory (targets valued at less than $500 million), which 
tend to include more hard-to-value targets (Francis et al. 2005; Doyle, Ge, and McVay 2007).  
We begin our analysis by estimating an acquirer advisor choice model to test if bidders select 
accounting firms based on their competitive strength in valuation. Accounting firm advisors are 
preferred by acquirers interested in hard-to-value targets, such as firms from an industry 
characterized by low accounting quality, smaller targets, when the target is a private firm, located 
outside the US, and from a high R&D industry. The economic importance of valuation difficulty in 
predicting the advisor choice is high. To illustrate, the odds an accounting firm will advise on a 
transaction are 105.9% higher when the target is in a low-accounting-quality industry. These 
findings suggest that when acquirers select advisors, the usefulness of accounting expertise in 
resolving valuation uncertainty is an important consideration. 
Our main analysis focuses on the acquirer’s announcement-period stock return, which captures 
the expected benefit an acquisition will bring to the acquirer’s shareholders (Cai, Kim, Park, and 
White 2015; Halpern 1983; Jensen and Ruback 1983; Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter 1988; Betton, 
Eckbo, and Thorburn 2008). Consistent with past evidence (Gu and Lev 2011, Mauboussin 2010; 
Raman, Shivakumar, and Tamayo 2013; Marquardt and Zur 2015), bidders experience negative 
price reactions when they attempt to acquire hard-to-value targets; the average bidder’s value 
reduces by around $50 million for targets with low accounting quality. Price reactions to deals 
advised by accounting firms are 0.4% higher compared to deals advised by investment banks, which 
translates into a $32 million shareholder value gain for a mean-sized bidder. Importantly, price 
reactions are higher when the target has low accounting quality and the accounting firm is an audit 
specialist of the target’s industry. This result is consistent with investors assessing that accounting 
firms lever on the industry knowledge accumulated through audit work to enhance M&A service 
quality. Further, investors react more positively to M&As advised by accounting firms that were 
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auditors of the targets. Such a dual role can reduce acquisition uncertainty as the advisor has access 
to firm-specific knowledge about the target accumulated through the audit process and informal 
discussions with the management.  
To further support the knowledge spillover explanation, we report that investors react more 
positively when the bidder is advised by one of the Big Four as opposed to a non-Big Four 
accounting advisor. Larger breadth of Big Four assurance work gives them an advantage over non-
Big Four firms in accumulating accounting knowledge, which can aid the M&A advisory team. 
Price reactions are also higher when the accounting firm advises on deals where the target’s auditor 
expresses a concern whether the financial statements are presented fairly, and when the accounting 
firm is additionally responsible for target’s due diligence. These results suggest that investors 
perceive accounting firms as being better able to unravel complexities involved in low-reliability 
target’s financials and during the due-diligence process. Consistent with geographic proximity 
facilitating knowledge transfer (Audretsch and Feldman 1996; Audretsch and Stephan 1996), price 
reactions are higher when target’s headquarters are in the capital city because the advisory and audit 
offices of accounting firms are also likely to be in capital cities. Valuation fairness should reduce 
the risk of wealth transfer from the bidder to the target. Consistently, we find lower target 
announcement returns when the bidder is advised by an accounting firm. Finally, we show that even 
top investment banks or advisory teams involving them are unable to replicate accounting firms’ 
competitive advantage in valuing low accounting quality targets. However, pairing them with an 
accounting firm generates synergies that associate with more positive price reactions.  
Our argument on knowledge spillover centers on the competitive advantage accounting firms 
have in target valuation. Consistently, we find that bidders are less likely to overpay for the target 
when they hire an accounting firm. Importantly, the lower likelihood of overpayment is linked to 
the valuation expertise of accounting firms, such as for targets in a low-accounting-quality industry 
and when the accounting firm is an audit specialist of this industry. Further, transactions advised by 
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accounting firms have a lower likelihood of post-deal impairment of goodwill recognized from 
M&A transactions. Gu and Lev (2011) report that the bulk of goodwill write-offs is due to bidders 
overpaying for targets. Accounting firm advised transactions also have higher completion rates. 
Accounting firms may be better at collecting and analyzing target information available prior to the 
announcement, which reduces the likelihood a deal will be terminated because new information 
becomes available to the bidder after the deal announcement regarding the true value of the target 
(Marquardt and Zur 2015).  
 We address the endogeneity concern in four ways. First, besides the full-sample analysis, we 
also perform analysis using the sample of deals advised by accounting firms and investment banks 
matched based on the propensity score predicted from the advisor choice analysis. Second, we use 
instrumental variables regression to mitigate potential distortion arising from the endogenous 
advisor choice. Third, we exploit a quasi-natural experiment arising from the introduction of the 
IFRS to do a difference-in-differences test. IFRS standardized reporting across European markets 
facilitating comparison and valuation. If both the target and acquirer report under IFRS, the benefits 
from appointing accounting firm advisors should be lower, a result we confirm. Fourth, a placebo 
test shows that substituting bidder’s for target’s reporting quality eliminates the evidence of higher 
price reactions for deals advised by accounting firms. This result is consistent with investors valuing 
advisor’s accounting knowledge about the target, not the acquirer, as helpful in valuing low-
accounting-quality targets (McNichols and Stubben 2015). In sum, all tests that address endogeneity 
support our main conclusions.  
 Our work advances the literature on several fronts. We are first to provide evidence consistent 
with knowledge spillover of audit-related accounting expertise to non-audit services in terms of 
M&A service quality. The nature of this effect is different from the reverse knowledge spillover 
from non-audit services to audit services documented in the literature (e.g., Knechel and Sharma 
2012; Knechel, Sharma, and Sharma 2012; Koh, Rajgopal, and Srinivasan 2013). We are also first 
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to document the growing visibility of accounting firms in the global M&A advisory market. The 
emergence of accounting firms as deal advisors and their consistent placement in top Thomson 
Reuters and NASDAQ OMX/Mergermarket rankings has evaded the accounting and finance 
literature (see Appendix A).  
Importantly, our study identifies significant gains to bidders when hiring accounting firms as 
advisors. Previous evidence suggests that on average acquiring firm shareholders do not benefit 
from acquisitions (Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller 2002; Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 2003; 
McNamara, Haleblain, and Dykes 2008), a result explained by frequent overpayment for targets 
(Mauboussin 2010; Gu and Lev 2011). This observation often captures newspaper headlines, for 
example, Businessweek’s “Mergers: Why Most Bid Deals Don’t Pay Off” (Henry and Jespersen 
2002). We show that accounting firm advisors are more preferred by acquirers for targets with higher 
valuation uncertainties where bidders are more likely to overpay.  
2. Institutional background, related literature, and hypotheses 
2.1 Mechanisms for knowledge spillover within accounting firms 
We expect accounting knowledge generated through audit engagements to spill over to M&A 
transactions for four reasons. First, accounting firms encourage mutual support between units in 
their networks, e.g. between the audit and M&A functions. To illustrate, PwC highlights that 
“[M]ember firms of PwCIL [PricewaterhouseCoopers International Limited] can … draw on the 
resources and methodologies of the PwC network. In addition, member firms may draw upon the 
resources of other member firms and/or secure the provision of professional services by other 
member firms” (Davies n.d.). In our industry interviews with practitioners, Helen Roxburgh, KPMG 
Corporate Finance Director, stresses that “the real differentiator [between accounting firms and 
investment banks] is that we [the accounting firms] have access to a much broader range of 
relationships that can help with the [M&A] transaction” and that “for a particular sector with 
complex accounting, we may reach to audit to understand the challenges in that sector or what the 
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underlying performance of the business is”. Sriram Prakash, Deloitte’ Global Lead of M&A Insight 
emphasizes that “the core skillset that Big Four bring and that you can transfer is accounting 
knowledge. Big Four are very good to attract accountants and this skill is crucial for tasks such as 
valuation. That is not replicable by investment banks.”. Moreover, even legal obstacles to direct 
information flows within an accounting firm are removable. For example, Burgess (2010) highlights 
that often, “[accounting] ﬁrms are able to receive a waiver for directors in private companies which 
they audit”.  
Second, audit personnel are often called to work on non-audit engagement teams. 5 In our 
industry interviews with practitioners, Andy Brogan, EY Transaction Advisory Services partner, 
highlights that “often valuation people working on M&As also work on assurance” and that M&A 
teams “bring in specialist knowledge [from other service lines] for transactions”, particularly from 
assurance for “anything that relates to accounting”.6  
Third, because of career and job satisfaction considerations, audit personnel have strong 
incentives to assist or participate in advisory services or even switch to the advisory units 
permanently. Agnew (2015) highlights that “[I]n the UK, none of the senior partners of the Big Four 
firms comes from a pure audit background. Instead they have come up through the ranks of advisory 
(PwC’s Mr Powell and EY’s Steve Varley), corporate finance (KPMG’s Mr Collins) and tax 
(Deloitte’s David Sproul).”. The Economist (2010) highlights that “Deloitte's audit directors referred 
                                                 
5  KPMG highlights that “when needed, we can quickly tap into industry-experienced professionals from other 
disciplines, including audit” (KPMG 2010). Deloitte advisory website states that “Deloitte capitalises on its vast 
valuation experience gained from assurance work” (Deloitte n.d.).  A financial advisory consultant at Deloitte with a 
focus on valuation and business modelling told us that he “heard some cases where staffing requirements due to bigger 
projects required ‘borrowing’ audit employees to meet deadlines. [He] can remember another case where an employee 
of the financial services audit department moved over to financial advisory (M&A) after the audit mandate was 
terminated and his industry expertise could be used in loan portfolio sales.” On the other hand, a valuations senior 
associate at PwC indicates on his LinkedIn profile that he “completed two rotations in the London Mid Tier [Technology, 
Media and Telecommunications (TMT)] Assurance business.” He has been involved in key valuation assignments, 
including “tax valuation of foreign exchange intermediary” and “impairment review of specialist publisher” – both 
require advanced accounting knowledge. 
6 Members of the M&A advisory team are not publicly known, which limits us from testing related predictions. 
However, web profiles of senior auditors often mention their engagements with M&A teams. Our search on LinkedIn 
revealed 3,893 auditors with experience in M&A engagements. 
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to their cross-selling work when discussing promotions” and “PWC stressed ‘business growth’ when 
handing out bonuses for auditors”. Because audit and tax-advice revenue have stagnated, auditors 
see M&A teams as an alternative career path. Online career blogs suggest audit experience is often 
a requirement for M&A posts, e.g. the Life of An Auditor blog mentions that “[T]o get into M&A 
diligence [at Big Four], you'd need to put in 3-4 years in audit, because they usually like people with 
audit experiences and CPA certifications” (“Valuation, M&A Diligence” 2012). A survey study by 
the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants found that only 38% of the audit staff in the poll 
were satisfied with their jobs (ACCA 2012). A press article reporting the study mentions the 
comment by a senior associate at PwC, who said that “the chance to do a one-year secondment in 
the advisory unit has given her great exposure and reckoned that such opportunities have contributed 
to her job satisfaction.” (Kwok 2012). In short, career and job satisfaction concerns encourage audit 
personnel to become involved in advisory services.  
Fourth, information gained through the audit process can enhance the quality of proprietary 
M&A analytics platforms. For example, KPMG highlights that “[e]stablishing industry benchmarks 
is essential to any acquisition or transaction” and that its analytics platform “leverages robust, 
proprietary database which gleans information from our engagements with 1,000+ private 
companies” (Buckley n.d.). Information spillover can also occur via channels like formal advice, 
informal consultation, or internal training by in-house accounting and audit specialists (Trotman, 
Bauer, and Humphreys 2015; Salterio and Denham 1997; Dittman, Juris, and Revsine 1980; Chen, 
Chang, and Lee 2008).   
2.2 Prior evidence on knowledge spillover within accounting firms 
Because of the public’s and regulators’ concerns, prior studies on non-audit services and 
knowledge spillover have focused on how the provision of such services affects auditor 
independence and audit quality. Contrary to the concerns about negative effects, the majority of the 
literature finds either no evidence of harmful links or evidence limited to particular circumstances 
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(DeFond, Raghunandan, and Subramanyam 2002; Kinney, Palmrose, and Scholz 2004; Causholli, 
Chambers, and Payne 2014). Rather, there are indications that knowledge spillover from non-audit 
services can improve audit quality (Robinson 2008; Svanstrom 2013) and audit efficiency, measured 
in terms of the audit report lag (Knechel and Sharma 2012; Knechel, Sharma, and Sharma 2012). 
By contrast, the literature on the knowledge spillover from audit services to non-audit services 
is sparse. Simunic (1984) examines this type of knowledge spillover, focusing on service cost rather 
than service quality. His use of audit fees and management advisory service (MAS) fees to proxy 
for service costs requires the critical assumption of competitive pricing. In addition, a positive 
association between audit fees and MAS fees may arise from correlated demands for the two types 
of services, instead of knowledge spillover (Palmrose 1986). Maydew and Shackelford (2005) 
discuss how the financial reporting expertise of accounting firms helps winning tax advisory 
mandates from audit clients. However, they do not provide any analysis to show that the audit 
expertise raises tax service quality. McGuire, Omer, and Wang (2012) find that an external audit 
firm’s greater overall expertise, defined based on the ﬁrm’s annual market share of both audit and 
tax consulting fees, is associated with greater tax avoidance by their clients. They quote Deloitte and 
Touche’s documents highlighting that “tax practice states that it combines with other divisions 
within the firm to assist clients”. Because their study has not separated audit expertise from tax 
expertise to examine the former’s standalone impact, it is not clear whether the finding should be 
viewed a knowledge spillover from audit to non-audit services. 
2.3 Hypotheses 
Our study is the first to provide evidence consistent with the knowledge spillover of audit-
related accounting expertise to M&A advisory services. Accounting firms can offer distinct 
advantages compared to investment banks—they can lever their audit expertise to produce fairer 
target valuation reducing the risk the bidder overpays for the target. Though target’s valuation is 
presumed to be based on future cash flows (Mukherjee, Kiymaz, and Baker 2004), accounting 
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information helps predict these cash flows (Dechow 1994; Barth, Cram, and Nelson 2001; 
McNichols and Stubben 2015). Importantly, Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2012, p. 286) 
highlight that “the acquisition technique and the valuations are generally determined by the advisor”, 
thus competitive valuation advantage will bear directly on deal pricing. PwC highlights that 
“[U]nderstanding a potential target’s accounting policies is essential to assessing its historical and 
projected earnings profile, as well as evaluating its market valuation comparables. […] While 
enterprise value, in theory, should not be affected by accounting policies, valuation techniques like 
EBITDA multiples can be impacted due to earnings variations resulting from accounting policy 
differences.” (PwC 2013). Accounting expertise should be particularly valuable for targets in low-
accounting-quality industries as these transactions are associated with less favorable outcomes. 
McNichols and Stubben (2015, p. 111) argue that “when the target firm has higher-quality 
accounting information, the acquirer can value the target firm with greater precision, bid more 
effectively, and ultimately pay less for the acquisition.” These predictions lead to two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Accounting firms are more likely to advise on transactions where the target has high 
valuation uncertainty.  
Hypothesis 2: Accounting expertise facilitates fair assessment of target’s value, reducing the 
likelihood of overpaying for the target. 
3. Data and sample  
The sample of acquisitions is from the SDC Platinum M&A database with the announcement 
date falling in the years between 1990 and 2014 inclusive. We place no restriction on the public 
status or nationality of the target, nor on the industry of the acquirer or the target, to minimize the 
risk of sample bias (Netter, Stegemoller, and Wintoki 2011). As is standard in previous studies (e.g. 
Golubov et al. 2012; Faccio, McConnell, and Stolin 2006), we require deals with explicit change of 
control, i.e., the acquirer must own initially less than 50% of the target’s stock and seek to own more 
than 50% after the acquisition. We also require the availability of data on the announcement date, 
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bidder SEDOL code, acquirer advisor name and acquirer advisor parent’s name, Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code, country of incorporation of the acquirer and the target, and deal value.     
The criteria above give rise to an initial sample of 9,655 transactions in 15 European countries. 
By definition, these transactions exclude in-house acquisitions where the acquirers do not employ a 
financial advisor (Golubov et al. 2012). SDC’s “Acquirer Financial Advisors” identifies the acquirer 
advisors and “Parent of Acquirer Advisors” the advisor’s parent company. We use the latter to 
identify accounting firms as advisors do not share the same name across markets. Appendix B1 
illustrate the match between the advisor and the parent for PwC. We manually identify the list of 
accounting firms based on the list of auditors on Compustat Global and searches on advisors’ 
websites. The list of SDC parent advisor codes and names we use to identify accounting firms is 
included in appendix B2. From the list, we retain deals where accounting firms’ assignment was 
“advisory”.7 We collect accounting and market information from Compustat Global Fundamentals 
and Compustat Global Security Daily files.  
4. The choice of accounting firms as M&A advisors 
Our first test looks at the likelihood of an accounting firm, as opposed to an investment bank, 
being selected as an advisor to the acquirer in an M&A transaction. We expect that the accounting 
expertise gained from engagements with audit clients gives accounting firms’ an advantage in 
handling deals with greater valuation uncertainty, raising their chance of being selected as an 
acquirer advisor for such transactions.  
Our first proxy for valuation uncertainty is a measure of target’s accounting quality, which we 
proxy by accruals quality. Accruals is a standard measure of accounting quality (e.g. Aboody, 
Hughes, and Liu 2005; Francis et al. 2004, 2005; Lee and Masulis 2009) and its use is consistent 
                                                 
7 Only in 3% of transactions accounting firms’ role is preparing fairness opinion. We do not focus on the quality of 
fairness opinion for accounting firms vs. investment banks as Derrien and Dessaint (2012, p. 27) report that “[a]ll 
fairness opinions reported in SDC conclude that the price is fair, because transactions in which the FO [fairness opinion] 
provider reaches the opposite conclusion do not reach the announcement stage.”.  
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with the survey evidence in Dichev et al. (2013), who report that CFOs consider high-quality 
earnings to be backed by cash flows. Penman and Sougiannis (1998) document that accuracy of free 
cash flow valuation, the main valuation technique used in M&As (Mukherjee, Kiymaz, and Baker 
2004), reduces in the magnitude and volatility of accruals. Raman, Shivakumar, and Tamayo (2013) 
and Marquardt and Zur (2015) use accruals to capture accounting quality and document that bidders 
are more likely to overpay for targets with low accounting quality. Accounting firms should have a 
distinct advantage in understanding accruals through their audit work (Becker et al. 1998; Francis 
and Yu 2009) and mitigate the negative effect low accrual quality has on valuation (Sloan 1996; 
Fairfield, Whisenant, and Yohn 2003).  
We define firms as of low accounting quality if they belong to an industry characterized by low 
accruals quality. We focus on the industry because (1) the measure is not affected by target’s 
deliberate manipulations of financial information in anticipation of a takeover, (2) this allows us to 
retain private targets in the sample, and (3) McNichols and Stubben (2015) find that acquisitions of 
targets from high accounting quality industries associate with more positive price reactions for the 
bidder. We measure accruals quality each year for each 2-digit SIC industry using the standard 
deviation of asset-scaled total accruals measured over the previous four years and then rank 
industries in ascending order. We construct an indicator variable, Target in low AQ industry, which 
equals 1 if the target belongs to the top two industries with the highest values of the equal-weighted 
average of the total accruals volatility of all the firms in the industry and 0 otherwise.8 
To ensure our conclusion is not driven by the choice of measure for target’s valuation 
uncertainty, we supplement the analysis with other proxies. We argue that private targets, Private 
target, are harder to value given the limited information available, low financial reporting quality, 
                                                 
8 We pool industries across target markets in calculating Target in low AQ industry because targets come from 116 
markets, which prevents reliable estimate at the country level for most markets. However, we show robustness of our 
conclusions for a sample of EU targets when Target in low AQ industry is estimated at the country level. We do not use 
discretionary accruals to capture accrual quality as they capture within-industry deviations from the expected amount of 
accruals, thus are not suitable for cross-industry comparisons.  
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and high information search costs. Compared to public companies, information about private entities 
is not as easily available owing to the lack of listing requirements by stock exchange or the lack of 
incentives for voluntary disclosure (Singhvi and Desai 1971). Hope, Thomas, and Vyas (2013) 
document that private firms have on average lower accrual quality and are less conservative as they 
face lower demand for financial information.  
We expect a target located outside the US to associate with higher valuation uncertainties. Prior 
research has documented higher financial reporting quality under US generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP) than other national GAAPs (Lang, Smith Raedy, and Wilson 2006). Significant 
differences remain despite enhanced financial reporting comparability with US firms after adopting 
IFRS (Barth et al. 2012). To capture this effect, we include a dummy variable, Non-US target, for 
whether the target is located outside the US.  
Larger deals associate with more investor and media scrutiny and negative consequences related 
to failed transactions may entice managers and boards to place more emphasis on fair valuation. 
Consistently, Raman et al. (2013) and Alexandridis et al. (2013) find that bidders are less likely to 
overpay for larger targets and Golubov et al. (2012) report more positive price reactions to 
acquisitions of relatively larger bidders. Thus, our final proxy for valuation uncertainty is the size 
of the bidder, which we proxy by deal size, Deal Value.9  
4.1 Control variables  
Controls are selected based on past literature and include Financing required to capture the 
external financing need for an M&A deal and Number of considerations offered to capture deal 
structure. Investment and commercial banks are known for their strength in organizing deal 
financing and should be preferred for more complex transactions where the payment involves a mix 
of cash, equity or hybrid financing (Burgess 2010). Cash offerings, Cash offering, are riskier to the 
                                                 
9 Deal Value also controls for higher activity of accounting firms in the mid- and low-market segment. 
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bidder, since any cost related to offer mispricing is born by the acquirer after the transaction. Bidders 
may favor accounting firms for these deals. We control for whether the deal is a hostile takeover, 
Hostile deals, and whether it includes more than one bidder, Competed deals, as acquirers may rely 
on investment banks for these transactions. Acquiring a target located outside the bidder’s home 
country is more challenging as the information may be prepared in a different language and with 
different accounting practices (Jeanjean et al. 2015). Thus, the demand for accounting firms’ 
expertise should be lower for domestic, Domestic, deals. 
Prior experience with an advisor builds trust and allows the advisor to study the bidder’s 
business model and needs motivating acquisitions (Sibilkov and McConnell 2014). To capture this 
effect, we control for the past relation between the bidder and advisor, Returning acquirer advisor. 
Percentage of shares sought captures the percentage of target shares the bidder seeks to acquire. 
Acquiring a larger stake in the target is more costly as potential misvaluation has a larger effect on 
bidder shareholders; bidders may opt to hire accounting firms for these transactions. We control for 
the number of advisors, Number of acquirer advisors, on a deal because bidders may be skeptical 
about the ability of accounting firms to advise on a transaction and may want to pair them with 
investment banks. Substantial family ownership of the target, Family owned target, may increase 
negotiation difficulties and chances of deal collapse (Bena and Li 2014). To reduce this risk, bidders 
may opt for investment bank advisers.  
We control for Acquirer size, as larger firms may prefer to use reputable investment banks rather 
than accounting firms (Indap 2015). We include the acquirer’s leverage ratio, Acquirer leverage, as 
acquirers with high leverage might favor investment bank advisors because of their strength in 
arranging financing. The acquirer’s book-to-market ratio, Acquirer B/M, and stock return 
momentum, Acquirer stock momentum, capture the overpricing of the bidder’s stock. Stock 
overvaluation increases the chances of opportunistic acquisitions (Akbulut 2013) and we expect that 
bidders prefer an investment bank advisor to add credibility to such transactions. Similarly, we 
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expect firms with a higher diversity of opinion about the firm’s prospects, measured by Acquirer 
stock volatility, to choose investment banks to certify the benefits of the transaction  Kim and 
Skinner (2012) associate higher stock volatility with higher deal litigation risk and hiring an 
investment bank may reduce litigation risk. 
 Bidders domiciled in countries with the common law legal system origin, Common Law, and 
high average ownership concentration, Ownership concentration, might favor accounting firm 
advisors if they believe the choice would lead to more accurate estimates of target’s value reducing 
the risk of negative deal outcomes. This is because the shareholder governance model in common 
law countries and blockholder monitoring makes managers more accountable (Ball, Kothari, and 
Robin 2000; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Schleifer and Vishny 1986), which increases the risk 
negative deal outcomes will lead to the dismissal of the managerial team (Lehn and Zhao 2006). 
High reporting standards in bidder’s country, High disclosure regulation, should associate with 
lower chances the bidder will use overpriced stock to pay for the target reducing the need to hire an 
investment bank to certify such transactions (Bowers and Miller 1990). We also include an indicator 
variable More aggregate earnings management if the target country’s aggregate earnings 
management is higher than that of the bidder country. These settings associate with increased 
information search and acquisition costs thus higher valuation uncertainty (Xie 2001; Louis 2004). 
Higher valuation uncertainty should favor accounting firm advisors. For completeness, we also 
include the aggregate earnings management score, Aggregate earnings management.   
The advisor choice regression controls for the industry and year fixed effects. The statistical 
tests on the estimated coefficients are based on clustered standard errors robust to within-industry 
correlation (Rogers 1993) and heteroskedasticity-adjusted (White 1980). We cluster on industry as 
M&As tend to happen in industry waves (Harford 2005; Ahern and Harford 2014). All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The baseline specification of the logit model 
predicting the adviser choice is as follows: 
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Pr(AF advisor = 1) = f(variables for valuation uncertainty, controls, ε),    (1) 
where AF advisor is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if an accounting firm is hired to 
advise on an M&A deal and 0 otherwise, f is the logistic function, and ε is a random error. Similar 
to past approaches for classifying transactions (Servaes and Zenner 1996; Rau 2000; Golubov et al. 
2012), we consider a transaction advised by an accounting firm if the accounting firm is either the 
sole advisor or part of a syndicate. Table 1 summarizes the definitions of the variables used in the 
advisor choice model and other analyses of the paper.   
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the advisor choice analysis. 
The table is partitioned into the M&A deals advised by accounting firms and by investment banks. 
We document that deals advised by accounting firms tend to be for targets in industries with lower 
accruals quality, and include more private, non-US, and relatively smaller targets. Accounting firms 
are also more likely to advise on deals where the target’s country has a higher aggregate earnings 
management score than the bidder’s. In sum, accounting firms advise precisely on the type of deals 
where accounting expertise should help resolve valuation uncertainties. 
4.2 Regression results for the advisor choice analysis  
Table 3 presents regression results for the advisor choice analysis. Panel A confirms the 
univariate evidence that accounting firms are more frequently selected to advise on transactions 
where the target is from the industry characterized by low accounting quality. This effect is 
economically significant—the odds an accounting firm will advise on an M&A transaction are 
105.9% higher when the target is in a low accruals quality industry. To address the concern the 
coefficient on  Target in low AQ industry may be affected by omitted correlated variables, we follow 
the approach from Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) and test by how much this coefficient changes 
compared to a model with only this covariate. If the change is substantial, then it is more likely that 
adding additional controls would reduce the estimated coefficient. The percentage change between 
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the coefficients is only 1.2%, which suggests that omitted variables are unlikely to explain the effect 
we document. 
Other proxies for target’s valuation uncertainty produce consistent evidence that accounting 
firms are more likely to advise on deals with high valuation uncertainty. These include deals 
targeting private, non-US and smaller targets. The complementary valuation uncertainty proxies are 
also economically important predictors of the advisor choice. In sum, Table 3 evidence supports the 
prediction that accounting firms are more likely to advise on deals with valuation uncertainty that 
their expertise can help to reduce.  
4.3 Additional results for the advisor choice analysis  
To corroborate the conclusion that accounting firms are more likely to advise on deals with high 
valuation uncertainty, we present four additional results. First, in model 1 of panel B, we calculate 
Target in low AQ industry at the country level for a sample of targets from largest EU markets, 
Target in low AQ industry at country level. Our conclusions from this regression are identical to our 
main findings.  
Second, in model 2, we include an indicator variable for a target from an R&D intensive industry 
using the industry classification from Lev and Sougiannis (1996) and Hirschey, Richardson, and 
Scholz (2001), Target in high R&D industry. Previous studies highlight higher valuation difficulty 
for R&D intensive firms (Lev and Sougiannis 1996; Clem, Cowan, and Jeffrey 2004) and we find 
that bidders are more likely to select an accounting firm advisor for deals involving a target from 
such an industry.  
Third, we use principal component analysis and create an index measure for target’s valuation 
uncertainty that balances the four valuation proxies, Target low reporting quality index. The weights 
are 0.14 for Target in low AQ industry, 0.58 for Private target, 0.24 for Non-US target and 0.63 for 
an indicator variable for small targets, which includes targets in the bottom quintile ranked on deal 
size. The coefficient on this index measure is highly statistically significant.  
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Our final test identifies instances when the auditor issued a qualified opinion about the target’s 
financial statements. High uncertainty surrounding the reliability of target’s financial statements 
increases the difficulty of the advisor’s valuation task, which should increase the likelihood that a 
bidder will select an accounting firm advisor. We collected target auditor opinions for public targets 
and code low-reliability financial statements as those with Compustat and Compustat Global auditor 
opinion codes 2, 3 and 5, Target qualified audit opinion. We also use the earnings and cash flows 
data of public targets to construct target firm-specific accruals measure, Target low AQ. This 
measure is defined as the standard deviation of target’s asset-scaled total accruals, which is the 
difference between net income and cash from operations measured over four years prior to the M&A 
deal. We also control for whether the target has reported losses in the year prior to the acquisition, 
Target Loss, and for target’s book-to-market ratio, Target B/M. Both the target-level qualified 
auditor opinion and low accruals quality variable are statistically significant with a consistently 
positive sign. Therefore, the valuation uncertainty intended to be captured by the target’s accruals 
quality does not critically depend on whether the proxy is industry-level or firm-level; however, the 
firm-level measure significantly reduces the sample size.10  
We recognize that because of familiarity, bidders may choose their auditors as advisor. We find 
that in 34.5% of transactions advised by accounting firms, the auditor is also the deal advisor. In 
unreported tests, we found no evidence that bidders systematically chose their auditors as advisors. 
To illustrate, PwC is both the advisor and auditor on 23.16% transactions involving an accounting 
firm advisor, which is close to the overall proportion of such transactions advised by PwC (23.26%). 
Lack of evidence that bidders systematically choose their auditors as advisors likely reflects that (1) 
the auditor may not have the knowledge advantage to value the target and (2) accounting firms try 
                                                 
10 In unablated results, we also find significantly lower target reporting quality of deals advised by accounting firms 
compared to investment banks when we use the Flesch-Kincaid readability measure for the narrative component of the 
annual report to capture accounting quality. This data is available only for the largest UK public firms over the period 
2005–2013 and we successfully matched 25 targets. The data was downloaded from 
http://reshare.ukdataservice.ac.uk/851859/  
 
19 
 
 
to avoid potential conflicts of interest arising from the joint role of auditor and M&A advisor, as 
stipulated in the code of professional conduct by certain professional body (see, e.g., IESBA 2010, 
pp. 86-88, on corporate finance services). In sum, results in this section suggest that bidders select 
accounting firms to advise on transactions where accounting firms’ expertise can be particularly 
valuable in resolving target’s valuation uncertainty. 
5. Acquirer announcement return  
This section examines whether investors perceive transactions advised by accounting firms to 
bring more benefits to the acquirers’ shareholders than those advised by investment banks, 
particularly for deals involving hard-to-value targets. If accounting firms’ expertise is perceived as 
beneficial, announcements for deals advised by accounting firms should trigger more positive price 
reactions for the acquirers’ stocks. To test this prediction, we calculate a five-day announcement 
period cumulative abnormal return, CAR, where the normal return benchmark is the stock market 
index of the acquirer’s listing exchange.   
The main variable of interest is the indicator variable for the accounting firm advisor, AF 
advisor. We expect this variable to load positively when regressed on announcement day returns. 
To test whether a stronger price reaction for deals advised by accounting firms is tied to their 
expertise accumulated through audit engagements, we create an indicator variable to capture the 
industry audit-specialist status of an accounting firm, AF advisor with industry expertise on 
accounting. This variable takes the value of 1 if the acquirer advisor is an accounting firm and an 
audit specialist of the target’s industry and 0 otherwise. The audit-specialist status of an industry is 
constructed according to the largest-industry-market-share definition in Lim and Tan (2008) and 
Mayhew and Wilkins (2003). Because industry accounting knowledge should be particularly 
valuable for targets in industries with low accounting quality, we interact the industry audit-
specialist variable with the indicator variable Target in low AQ industry. We expect the interaction 
term to load positively in the return regression. The baseline specification of the regression model 
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for the acquirer return analysis is as follows:  
CAR = α0 + α1 AF advisor + α2 AF advisor with industry expertise on accounting  
         + α3 (AF advisor with industry expertise on accounting  
                  × Target in low AQ industry) 
         + α4 Target in low AQ industry 
         + Λ5 Controls + Λ6 Year effects + Λ7 Industry Effects + ε.      
(2) 
The regression controls are the same as in model (1). We control for the method of payment as 
cash-financed acquisitions elicit more favorable price reactions (Travlos 1987), and for the previous 
relation between the bidder and the advisor as acquirers are more likely to retain better-performing 
advisors (Sibilkov and McConnell 2014). We control for the size of the advisory team as co-advisors 
may benefit from the synergy of their expertise ensuring better risk sharing and monitoring, which 
can produce better outcomes (Hunter and Jagtiani 2003). Previous research documents higher price 
reactions for relatively larger transactions (Golubov et al. 2012) and for private targets (Fuller et al. 
2002), so we control for the deal value and whether the target is a private firm. We also include 
controls for cross-border deals and for whether the target has significant family ownership as these 
transactions tend to have disappointing outcomes (Eckbo and Thorburn 2000; Basu, Dimitrova, and 
Paeglis 2009).  Finally, we include acquirer characteristics and country controls, as well as dummy 
variables for the year and industry fixed effects.  
Panel A of table 4 reports average CARs for deals split by the type of acquirer advisor. Price 
reactions for deals advised by accounting firms are on average over two times of those advised by 
investment banks (2.02% vs. 0.92%). These results suggest substantial gains to bidders when they 
hire accounting firms to advise on M&As. 
Regressions results in panel B confirm that bidders experience negative price reactions when 
they attempt to acquire hard-to-value targets with average bidder’s value reducing by around $50 
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million.11 This result is consistent with past evidence (Gu and Lev 2011, Mauboussin 2010, Raman 
et al. 2013, and Marquardt and Zur 2015). The coefficient on AF advisor is positive for the baseline 
and the full specification of equation (2), which confirms higher price reactions to deals advised by 
accounting firms. For the baseline model, the magnitude of price reaction is 0.4% higher for deals 
advised by accounting firms, which translates into a $32 million shareholder value gain for a mean-
sized bidder.  
Consistent with the knowledge spillover hypothesis, the coefficient on the interaction term AF 
advisor with industry expertise on accounting × Target in low AQ industry is positive. This result 
suggests that investors recognize the audit-related expertise of accounting firms as their unique 
strength not shared by investment banks. Similarly to the logit regression, we also perform the 
Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) test to determine how stronger selection on unobservables would 
have to be compared to selection on observables in order to fully explain away our result. The 
difference in coefficients from equation (3) compared to the model that excludes all controls is less 
than 5%, which suggests that omitted correlated variables are unlikely to account for our result.  
Finally, model 3 in Panel B shows that our conclusions are unchanged when we use Target in 
low AQ industry calculated at each target country level.  
5.1 Further results: accounting firm characteristics 
We perform additional tests related to accounting firm characteristics to corroborate the 
conclusion that knowledge spillover helps accounting firms offer superior M&A advisory services. 
First, model 1 in Panel C documents a stronger effect on the acquirer announcement return for deals 
with targets in low-accounting-quality industries when the accounting firm advisor is a Big Four 
(Big 4) rather than anon-Big Four. The Big Four are believed to be capable of perform higher-quality 
audits. Their bigger networks allow them to have more private and public clients as well as more in-
                                                 
11 We calculate this number by multiplying the coefficient value by the bidder’s average market capitalization, i.e. 
−0.006×USD8466m. 
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house specialists, facilitating expertise building. This gives Big Four an advantage over non-Big 
Four firms in accumulating accounting knowledge that can aid the M&A advisory teams.  
Model 2 extends equation (2) by including an indicator variable for whether the accounting firm 
advisor is also the auditor of the target. Holding such a dual role can reduce acquisition uncertainty 
as the AF advisor has access to firm-specific knowledge about the target accumulated through the 
audit process and informal discussions with the target’s management. Firm-specific knowledge 
about the target can enhance knowledge of the target’s industry that is captured by the accounting 
firm specialist status. For this test, we create an indicator variable AF advisor is target auditor that 
takes the value of 1 if the AF advisor is also target’s auditor in the year before the transaction and is 
0 otherwise. We also interact this indicator with Target in low AQ industry. Our search on 
Compustat, Compustat Global, Worldscope and Fame for target auditors identifies 275 target 
auditors for bidders using accounting firms, of which 69 (25%) include cases where the bidder’s 
advisor is also target’s auditor.12 Regression results show a significant coefficient on the interaction 
term AF advisor is target auditor × Target in low AQ industry, consistent with investors perceiving 
dual roles of advisor and target’s auditor as generating informational advantage when target has low 
reporting quality.    
Recall that our earlier results suggest acquirers do not systematically choose their auditors as 
deal advisors. However, the acquirer auditor’s knowledge may be useful in within-industry mergers, 
particularly in low reporting quality industries. In such transactions, the auditor has a competitive 
advantage to value the target. To test this prediction, we augment equation (2) with an indicator 
variable for whether the auditor advised the bidder on a transaction, AF advisor is acquirer auditor, 
and interact it with the indicator variables for intra-industry merger, Intra-industry merger, and with 
                                                 
12 The small proportion of transactions where bidder’s advisor is also target’s auditor reflects that accounting firm 
advisors have to be careful in requesting information from target auditors as “[A] request from an acquiring partner for 
confidential client information from a target client partner is an ethically challenged request”. Further, an acquisition of 
the target results in a loss of future audit fees from the target and an accounting firm “may prefer acquisition bids to be 
withdrawn or to fail since the acquisition of a target client results in the loss of future fees and partner income for that 
partner or practice.” (McKenna 2015). 
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Target in low AQ industry. The positive coefficient on the triple interaction term reported in model 
3 of panel C is consistent with knowledge spillover from the audit work benefiting the bidder. The 
negative coefficient on Intra-industry merger × Target in low AQ industry suggests that investment 
banks do not have a competitive advantage to advise on such transactions. 
Model 4 reports results for a sample of deals where the party carrying out the due diligence can 
be identified. The variable Due diligence by advisor indicates whether the advisor is also the party 
carrying out the due diligence. Owing to conflict of interest concerns, investors are expected to react 
negatively to the announcements of deals when due diligence is performed by an investment bank 
(Due diligence by advisor = 1). Baker and Kiymaz (2011) document that investment banks are 
opportunistic and provide favorable opinions of M&A transactions to secure the deal-contingent 
advisory fees and in response to boards’ seeking legal cover against shareholders unhappy with the 
deal’s terms. The negative coefficient on Due diligence by advisor in model 4 supports this 
prediction. However, this negative impact is largely offset by the positive coefficient for the 
interaction term AF advisor × Due diligence by advisor. Due diligence should be particularly 
important in cases when target’s report quality is low, and the positive interaction AF advisor × Due 
diligence by advisor × Target in low AQ industry supports this prediction. This result is consistent 
with the accounting expertise of accounting firms lending credibility to their role as due diligence 
advisors. 
Prior research shows that geographic proximity facilitates knowledge transfer (Audretsch and 
Feldman 1996; Audretsch and Stephan 1996). Thus, the acquirer announcement return should be 
higher when the accounting firm advisor has the corporate finance and audit offices in the same city. 
We cannot identify the specific locations of the corporate finance and audit offices of accounting 
firm advisors but it is reasonable to assume they are likely to locate in the capital of a country.  When 
the headquarters of the target is in the capital, Target in capital city., the advantage of hiring an 
accounting firm advisor would be stronger if there is a knowledge spillover from the audit to the 
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M&A advisory services. Consistent with the prediction, model 5 documents a positive coefficient 
on AF advisor × Target in capital city. Importantly, the zero coefficient on Target in capital city 
suggests that capital location does not affect price reactions for deals advised by investment banks.   
 
5.2 Further results: target’s reporting quality and announcement day return 
To ensure that our conclusions are not driven by the specific measure of valuation difficulty, 
model 1 in Panel D reports regression results for equation (2) when we include the index measure 
capturing small, private, non-US targets in a low accruals quality industry, Target reporting quality 
index. We then interact this index measure with AF advisor. The positive coefficient on the 
interaction term corroborates that investors react more favorably to deals with higher valuation 
uncertainty that are advised by accounting firms.   
In model 2, Panel D, we include an alternative index measure for target valuation uncertainty 
from a principal component analysis using target’s accruals volatility, whether the target reported 
losses before the acquisition and target’s B/M ratio, Target low reporting quality index2. The 
weights for each component are 0.70 for Target low AQ, 0.56 for Target Loss and -0.25 for Target 
B/M. The coefficient on the interaction between the index measure and AF advisor is positive and 
significant. We recognize that low accounting quality can associate with high operating uncertainty 
and to control for the latter, we include target’s earnings volatility in model 2, Target earnings 
volatility, which is the volatility of asset-scaled net income measures over four years prior to the 
acquisition. Similar to McNichols and Stubben (2015), who used cash flow volatility to measure 
target’s operating uncertainty, we find that target’s earnings volatility does not associate with 
acquirer announcement returns when we control for target’s reporting quality. 
Model 3 documents that price reactions are higher when the accounting firm advises on deals 
where the target’s auditor expresses a concern on whether the financial statements are presented 
fairly (i.e., qualified / adverse / no opinion). This result is consistent with investors perceiving 
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accounting firms as better able to understand the implications of not receiving an unqualified 
opinion. Accounting firm advisors are capable of forming their own assessment given the accounting 
expertise from their roles as the auditor of other clients. 
Model 4 examines targets’ announcement day returns, instead of acquirers’. Contrary to bidders, 
targets tend to experience significant positive price reactions. Past studies attribute the finding to a 
wealth transfer from the bidder to the target because bidders overpay for targets (Jensen and Ruback 
1983; Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter 1988; Datta, Pinches, and Narayanan 1992). If accounting firm 
advisors promote valuation fairness, they should reduce the risk of wealth transfer from the bidder 
to the target. Consistently, model 4 shows lower target announcement returns when the bidder is 
advised by an accounting firm.  
5.3 Further results: advisory team/advisor characteristics 
 Similar to past approaches for classifying transactions (Servaes and Zenner 1996; Rau 2000; 
Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos 2012), we consider a transaction advised by an accounting firm if 
the accounting firm is either the sole advisor or part of a syndicate. However, our conclusions could 
be confounded by the pairing of investment banks with accounting firms and it is the former that 
generate benefits to the acquirer. To ensure robustness of our results, we also re-estimated equation 
(2) for deals with single advisors. Model 1 in Panel E reports that our conclusions are unchanged 
for this subsample. This result is unsurprising since accounting firms tend to advise on mid- and 
small-level transactions, which frequently have only one advisor (close to 66% of transactions 
advised by accounting firms have only one advisor). 
Next, we show that investors do not perceive top-rated investment banks to have a competitive 
advantage to advise on deals where the target has low reporting quality. This result suggests the 
accounting firms’ valuation advantage is not easily replicable. Specifically, we augment equation 
(2) to include an indicator for top-tier investment banks using the classification from Fang (2005) 
and Golubov et al. (2012), Top IB, and its interaction with the indicator variable Target in low AQ 
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industry. Results for model 2 in Panel E show an insignificant coefficient on this interaction term, 
suggesting that investors do not perceive top investment banks to have a competitive advantage to 
advise on such transactions. To sharpen this analysis, we also include an indicator variable for 
whether the advisor completed the most M&A transactions in the target’s industry over the previous 
three years, Advisor is industry specialist. We then interact the advisor’s industry specialist status 
with the target reporting quality measure. The interaction term tests whether investment bank 
advisors can develop valuation expertise similar to accounting firms. We do not find evidence that 
investors react more positively to specialist advisors when the target is in a low accrual quality 
industry. Together, model 2 results corroborate the view that understanding accruals is a unique 
strength of accounting firms not shared by even top-tier investment banks or specialist advisors.  
 Investment banks may create advisory teams to better cope with transactions involving hard-
to-value targets. Advisory syndicates can reduce information acquisitions costs and efficiently 
leverage on individual members expertise (Grullon, Underwood, and Weston 2014). The last model 
in Panel E interacts the size of the syndicate with Target in low AQ industry; however, the coefficient 
on the interaction term is negative. A triple interaction with an indicator for top investment bank is 
not significant, which suggests that even including a large reputable investment bank in an advisory 
team does not overcome the challenges related to target valuation. However, pairing an investment 
bank with an accounting firm generates positive price reactions for deals involving a hard-to-value 
target. This result suggests advisory teams benefit from the competitive strength accounting firms 
bring to the advisory team, which lies in target valuation.    
5.4 Endogeneity considerations 
Acquirers selecting accounting firm advisors can be systematically different from those 
selecting investment bank advisors. To address this concern, we perform four tests. First, we carry 
out the acquirer return analysis using instrumental variables (IV) regression. The instrument is the 
proportion of M&A transactions advised by accounting firms in a two-digit industry of the bidder 
 
27 
 
 
over the past three years. Building on the network literature (Leary and Roberts 2014), we expect 
that a bidder will more likely choose an accounting firm advisor if peer firms more frequently rely 
on accounting firm services. However, past peer choices are unaffected by idiosyncratic shocks to 
the bidder that could influence the choice of the accounting firm advisor, such as particular bidder 
or target characteristics, which limits the correlation between the instrument and the return 
regression residual. Thus, this instrument meets both the exclusion restriction and relevance 
condition. Using this instrumental variable, we estimate the baseline acquirer return regression using 
two-stage least squares. Model 1 in Panel F reports results for the IV regression, which confirms 
that deals advised by accounting firms elicit more positive price responses at the announcement. 
Second, for each bidder, we use the advisor choice regression (equation (1)) to estimate the 
probability of choosing an accounting firm advisor. This constitutes the propensity score for 
matching investment-bank-advised deals to accounting-firm-advised deals. Then we use the 
estimated probabilities to form match pairs of observations where firms have a similar ex-ante 
probability of being advised by an accounting firm, but different ex-post realizations (treatment and 
control groups). This is one-to-one nearest neighbor matching within a 0.05 caliper. This method 
allows us to find counterfactuals similar on the matching dimensions but that differ in terms of 
advisor and deal outcomes. Differences in acquirer returns between the two groups measure the 
effect of the advisor choice. The PSM sample has 1,382 deals advised by accounting firms and 
investment banks with non-missing information on announcement-period returns. The mean 
difference in predicted probability between the treatment (deals advised by accounting firms) and 
the control sample (matched deals advised by investment banks) is 0.02% and we report statistics 
for the quality of matching on individual covariates in Appendix C. The difference in CARs for the 
accounting firm advised deals and the PSM matched sample of investment bank deals is 0.69% 
(2.02% vs. 1.33%). We then re-estimate the acquirer return regression to control for residual 
differences in covariates as suggested by Shipman, Swanquist, and Whited (2017). Model 2 in Panel 
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F confirms more positive price reactions for deals where the target is in an industry with low 
accounting quality and the accounting firm is an audit specialist of the industry. 
Third, we take advantage of a quasi-natural experiment due to the IFRS introduced in Europe. 
IFRS standardized reporting across European markets facilitating comparison and valuation. If both 
the target and acquirer report under IFRS, the benefits from appointing accounting firm advisors 
should be lower. Consistently, Model 3 in Panel F shows a negative coefficient for the interaction 
between AF advisor and the indicator variables for bidder and target reporting under IFRS. 
Fourth, we run a placebo test that substitutes bidder’s for target’s accounting quality. We 
measure acquirer’s accounting quality by the volatility of total accruals scaled by total assets over 
four years prior to the acquisition, Acquirer low AQ. Accounting knowledge about the acquirer 
should not on average facilitate target’s valuation task, thus the interaction term between accounting 
firm target specialist status and acquirer reporting quality should be zero. Model 4 in Panel F shows 
an insignificant coefficient for the interaction term between advisor’s audit specialist status of the 
target’s industry and acquirer accounting quality. This result is consistent with accounting 
knowledge about the target, not about the acquirer, helping value the target. In sum, the results from 
tests that address the endogeneity concern provide consistent support to our conclusion that investors 
react more positively to M&A transactions advised by accounting firms.    
6. Offer premium  
We argue that the unique strength of accounting firms as M&A advisors stems from their 
accounting expertise, which helps reduce valuation uncertainty. Reduced valuation uncertainty 
allows the acquirer to more accurately estimate the target’s reservation price and thereby lower the 
offer premium. To test this prediction, we define the variable Offer premium as (the ratio of the bid 
price per share to the target’s closing stock price 1 day prior to announcement – 1) × 100. Like 
Dimopoulos and Sacchetto (2014), we consider only the premium corresponding to the final offer. 
This is the winning bid in a successfully completed takeover or otherwise the last withdrawn bid in 
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an unsuccessful takeover. The full specification of the regression model for the offer premium 
analysis is as follows:  
Offer premium = β0 + β1 AF advisor + β2 AF advisor with industry expertise on accounting  
                         + β3 (AF advisor with industry expertise on accounting  
                                  × Target in low AQ industry) 
                         + β4 Target in low AQ industry  
                         + Β5 Controls + Β6 Year effects + Β7 Industry Effects + ε.      
(3) 
As in the acquirer announcement-period return analysis, the coefficients of interest are β1 to β3. We 
expect accounting firms to help negotiate lower average premiums, particularly for targets with low 
accounting quality. The set of controls is the same as in equation (1). 
Panel A of Table 5 reports average premiums for the sample split by the advisor type. Deals 
with accounting firm advisors have on average a 13.88% lower premium compared to deals advised 
by investment banks (25.46% vs. 29.56%), which is significant under a one-tailed t-test.13 The 
univariate results provide preliminary evidence suggesting that bidders advised by accounting firms 
are able to pay lower premiums to their targets. 
Panel B of table 5 reports the regression estimates of the offer premium analysis. Model 1 of 
the panel confirms the univariate results of lower premiums for accounting-firm-advised deals. 
Specifically, we document a 3.3% lower premium on deals advised by accounting firms, which 
translates into average savings of $61.5 million for a mean-sized deal. The positive coefficient of 
Target in low AQ industry is consistent with prior research suggesting that bidders tend to overpay 
for targets with poor accounting quality (Raman, Shivakumar, and Tamayo 2013; Marquardt and 
Zur 2015; McNichols and Stubben 2015). Model 2 shows that the lower premiums associate with 
the competitive strength of accounting firms, namely for deals where the accounting firm is audit 
specialist of the target’s industry and the target’s industry is of low accounting quality. We confirm 
                                                 
13 For the PSM sample, the saving is 12.43% (an offer premium of 25.46% for accounting firm advisors vs. 29.07% for 
investment banks). Because the offer premium data are only available for listed targets, the PSM sample reduces to 64 
deals advised by accounting firms and their matches advised by investment banks. 
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this conclusion for the PSM sample in model 3.  
Together, the results in Table 5 confirm that the quality of accounting firms’ advice, which is 
linked to audit-related accounting expertise, translates into more competitively priced transactions 
for the bidders.14   
7. Additional analyses 
7.1 Goodwill impairment likelihood  
Goodwill is the part of the purchase price exceeding the fair market value of identifiable assets of 
the target. If the goodwill recognized from M&A transactions is driven by overpricing, it would 
have a greater chance to be impaired when the overpricing becomes clear to investors over time. 
IFRS requires goodwill to be tested at least annually for impairment. Such goodwill impairment, 
however, will be less likely if accounting firms’ expertise helps avoid overpricing.  
Panel A of table 6 shows the fraction of the combined firms reporting goodwill impairment 
within five years after the transactions, as examined in Fich, Rice, and Tran (2016), Gu and Lev 
(2011), and Li et al. (2011).15 We document that the likelihood of experiencing goodwill impairment 
shortly after the transaction is 25.77% lower among the combined firms from accounting-firm-
advised deals than from investment-bank-advised deals (26.2% for the PSM sample). Thus, 
transactions advised by accounting firms have a lower likelihood of post-deal impairment of 
goodwill recognized from M&A transactions, which corroborates our main conclusion.   
7.2 Deal completion rates 
If accounting firms are better at collecting and analyzing target information available prior to 
the announcement, the risk of material information emerging after the announcement should be 
lower. This in return should reduce the risk of merger failure. Merger failure can occur for a variety 
                                                 
14 In unreported results, we find that our conclusions are unchanged when we define the offer premium as the ratio of 
the bid price per share to the target’s closing stock price 4 weeks prior to the announcement.  
15 Information on goodwill impairment is from Worldscope and if missing, we use information on special items from 
Compustat Global. 
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of reasons, which include the occurrence of “material adverse effect” events, problems discovered 
during the due diligence process, or a receipt of a higher bid (Luo 2005). Material adverse effect 
clauses allow the bidder to terminate the deal if specific events are triggered, which include 
economic or industry shocks, financial misreporting, and regulatory changes (Denis and Macias 
2013). Bates and Lemmon (2003) report that 21% of M&A transactions fail, and that failed deals 
lead to reputational costs for the managerial team such as forced bidder firm CEO departure (Lehn 
and Zhao 2006) and negative market reactions (Jacobsen 2014; Davidson, Dutia, and Cheng 1989).  
To test the prediction that accounting firms help reduce the risk of deal termination, we identify 
all deals with SDC withdrawn status. There are 639 transactions falling into this category. Panel B 
of Table 6 reports a lower frequency of deal termination for transaction advised by accounting firms 
compared to investment banks for the pooled sample (0.13% vs. 7.38%) and the PSM sample (0.13% 
vs. 0.87%). This result is consistent with accounting firms being able to reduce the risk that adverse 
information emerging after the deal announcement increases the deal completion rate.   
7.3 Future profitability  
An alternative explanation for our results is that deals advised by accounting firms capture 
instances where acquirers estimate lower benefits of the transaction, thus are willing to pay lower 
premiums, but investors overestimate the expected merger gains and overreact at the deal 
announcement. To test this proposition, Panel C of table 6 reports the mean industry-adjusted future 
profitability measured over five years after the transaction, of the combined firms from accounting-
firm-advised deals versus investment-bank-advised deals. We do not find evidence that the future 
performance of deals advised by accounting firms is different compared to investment-bank advised 
transactions for the full or the PSM sample. Thus, it is unlikely that accounting firms advise on 
targets with poor reporting quality, yet better ex-post performance. These results are in line with our 
main findings on the competitive strength and service quality of accounting firm advisors and are 
consistent with investors correctly interpreting the benefit from hiring accounting firms as advisors.  
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8. Conclusion 
This study provides evidence consistent with knowledge spillover of audit-related accounting 
expertise to M&A advisory services. Our results support the perspective that the competitive 
strength of accounting firm M&A advisors is due to their accounting expertise that helps reduce 
valuation uncertainty. A question remains: why do so many acquirers still hire investment bank 
advisors? According to Axworthy and Stinga (2015), “[M]any clients still do not perceive the ‘Big 
4’ as deal advisors. At their core they are accounting firms and their corporate finance practices in 
the past have carried out due diligence work. Companies often overlook them for lead advisory work 
and choose investment banks or boutique advisory firms for this type of service.”. Indap (2015) 
points out that “[l]arge companies are particularly status conscious and because of legal scrutiny 
from being listed, may hesitate to stray towards companies whose identity – fairly or not – lies in 
bookkeeping.”. Executives often show a clear preference for investment banks not justified by 
service quality. Noonan (2016) quotes an M&A executive at a large London multinational company 
who replied with double “No” when asked whether top US investment banks “work harder or 
smarter than other global banks” to justify their frequent advisory roles. Our evidence on the 
competitive strength of accounting firms in the valuation area, coupled with the vast evidence that 
even reputable investment banks appointments do not mitigate the overpayment risk, should entice 
managers to reevaluate their future M&A advisory choices.      
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Appendix A. M&A advisor league tables 
Thomson Reuters Worldwide Mid-Market and Small-Cap Rankings for the first quarter of 2015 
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Appendix B1. Names of M&A advisors associated with PwC 
The table shows names of advisors on SDC and their codes where the parent is PwC. 
Advisor name SDC advisor code Parent Name 
Price Waterhouse Corporate Fin PRICE-CORP-FIN PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers Secur PWC-SECURITIES PricewaterhouseCoopers 
PricewaterhouseCoopers PWC PricewaterhouseCoopers 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (Aus) PWC-AUS PricewaterhouseCoopers 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (JP) PWC-JAPAN PricewaterhouseCoopers 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (SG) PWC-SG PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Pricewaterhousecoopers Corpora PWC-CF-SAS PricewaterhouseCoopers 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Secur PWC-SEC PricewaterhouseCoopers 
PwC Advisory Co Ltd (JP) PWC-ADV-JAPAN PricewaterhouseCoopers 
PwC Transaction Services Inc PWC-TRANS-SVCS PricewaterhouseCoopers 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (UK) PWC-UK PricewaterhouseCoopers 
  
 
Appendix B2. SDC parent advisor codes and names 
The table reports parent advisor codes and names of accounting firms on SDC. 
 
SDC parent advisor codes SDC parent advisor names 
ARTHUR-ANDERSEN Arthur Andersen 
BAKER-TILLY-INT Baker Tilly  
BDO BDO 
CROWECLARK Crowe Clark Whitehill  
DELOITTE Deloitte 
ERNST-YOUNG Ernst & Young  
GRANT-INTL Grant Thornton 
KPMG KPMG 
MCGLADREY-CM McGladrey Capital Markets 
PANNELL-KERR Pannell Kerr Forster 
PKF-INTL PKF International  
PKFITALIA PKF Italia  
PWC PricewaterhouseCoopers 
RSM-BENTJEN RSM Bentley Jennison 
RSM-TENON RSM Tenon Group  
RSMROB RSM Robson Rhodes 
SMITH-W Smith & Williamson Securities 
TENON-GROUP Tenon Group  
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Appendix C. Propensity score matching quality 
The table reports quality of propensity score matching for the sample of 793 transactions advised by accounting firms 
matched to a control sample of transactions advised by investment banks. We report means and medians for variables in 
the advisor choice equation (1) for the treatment (deals advised by accounting firms) and the control sample (deals 
advised by investment banks) and the respective p-values for the differences. Matching uses nearest neighbor with a 
0.05 calliper.  
  
Treatment 
sample 
mean 
Control 
sample 
mean 
p-value for 
difference 
Treatment 
sample 
median 
Control 
sample 
median 
p-value for 
difference  
A. Valuation uncertainty       
Target in low AQ industry 0.045 0.041 0.690 0.000 0.000 0.690 
Private target 0.415 0.418 0.913 0.000 0.000 0.913 
Non-US target 0.886 0.900 0.385 1.000 1.000 0.385 
Deal value ($mil) 278.9 316.6 0.401 49.032 46.223 0.554 
B. Deal value, financing, and method of payment 
Financing required 0.156 0.182 0.197 0.000 0.000 0.197 
Cash offering 0.415 0.386 0.273 0.000 0.000 0.273 
Number of considerations offered 1.428 1.424 0.908 1.000 1.000 0.419 
C. Past relation with the advisor       
Returning acquirer advisor 0.334 0.342 0.776 0.000 0.000 0.776 
D. Other deal characteristics       
Percentage of shares sought 89.918 88.472 0.256 100.000 100.000 0.246 
Number of acquirer advisors 1.524 1.621 0.299 1.000 1.000 0.106 
Hostile deal 0.003 0.004 0.654 0.000 0.000 0.654 
Competed deal 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Domestic 0.504 0.525 0.420 1.000 1.000 0.420 
Family owned target  0.003 0.001 0.564 0.000 0.000 0.563 
E. Acquirer characteristics       
Acquirer size  4631.7 5011.6 0.425 815.777 853.952 0.518 
Acquirer B/M 0.675 0.668 0.846 0.503 0.485 0.554 
Acquirer leverage 0.165 0.164 0.921 0.128 0.137 0.628 
Acquirer stock momentum 0.090 0.079 0.497 0.040 0.047 0.554 
Acquirer stock volatility 0.107 0.106 0.864 0.059 0.059 0.872 
F. Country characteristics (Acquirer) 
Common law  0.508 0.505 0.914 1.000 1.000 0.914 
Ownership concentration 0.200 0.290 0.995 0.240 0.240 0.614 
Disclosure regulation 0.694 0.693 0.824 0.750 0.750 0.614 
Aggregate earnings management  12.136 12.077 0.869 7.000 7.000 0.742 
G. Country characteristics (Target) 
More aggregate earnings 
management  0.169 0.165 0.829 0.000 0.000 0.829 
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The figure reports the total number of M&A transactions over the period 1990–2014 and the percentage of M&A transactions advised by accounting firms. 
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Table 1 Variable definitions 
    This table presents the definitions of the main variables used in the study.  
Variable Definition 
Target valuation uncertainty measures  
Target in low AQ industry An indicator variable equal to 1 if the target belongs to the top two industries with the 
lowest accruals quality, and 0 otherwise. We measure accruals quality by the standard 
deviation of the asset-scaled total accruals over a four-year period before the 
acquisition and then take the equal-weighted average across all publicly listed firms in 
a 2-digit SIC industry.     
Target in low AQ industry 
measured at country level 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the target belongs to the top two industries in a 
country with the lowest accruals quality, and 0 otherwise. We measure accruals quality 
by the standard deviation of the asset-scaled total accruals over a four-year period 
before the acquisition and then take the equal-weighted average across all publicly 
listed firms in a country in a 2-digit SIC industry. 
Private target An indicator variable equal to 1 if the target is a private firm and 0 otherwise. 
Non-US target An indicator variable equal to 1 if the target is not incorporated in the US and 0 
otherwise. 
Deal value The market value of the shares sought in the M&A deal expressed in USD million 
using the exchange rate at the end of the month preceding the transaction. 
Target in high R&D 
industry 
 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the target is from an R&D intensive industry using 
the industry classification from Lev and Sougiannis (1996) and Hirschey, Richardson, 
and Scholz (2001) and 0 otherwise. 
Target low reporting 
quality index 
An index measure from the principal component analysis of target’s valuation 
uncertainty proxies. The weights are 0.14 for Target in low AQ industry, 0.58 for 
Private target, 0.24 for Non-US target and 0.63 for an indicator variable for small 
targets, which includes targets in the bottom quintile ranked on deal size. 
Target low reporting 
quality index2 
An alternative index measure created based on the principal component analysis of the 
target’s valuation uncertainty proxies. The weights are 0.70 for Target low AQ, 0.56 
for Target Loss and -0.25 for Target B/M. 
Target low AQ The target’s standard deviation of the asset-scaled total accruals over four-year period 
prior to the M&A deal.  
Target loss An indicator variable equal to 1 if the target reported a loss in the most recent fiscal 
year before the acquisition, and 0 otherwise. 
Target qualified opinion An indicator variable for low-reliability financial statements coded as 1 for targets with 
Compustat Global auditor opinion codes 2, 3 and 5, and 0 otherwise. 
Accounting advisor characteristics 
Big 4 An indicator variable equal to 1 if the accounting firm advisor is a Big 4 auditor and 0 
otherwise.  
AF advisor is target 
auditor 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the accounting firm advisor is also target’s auditor 
and 0 otherwise.  
AF advisor is acquirer 
auditor 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the accounting firm advisor is also acquiror’s auditor 
and 0 otherwise.  
Due diligence by advisor An indicator variable equal to 1 if the advisor is responsible for target’s due diligence 
and 0 otherwise.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (continued on next page) 
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Table 1 (continued)  
Variable Definition 
Deal characteristics  
AF advisor An indicator variable equal to 1 if the acquirer advisor is an accounting firm and 0 
otherwise 
AF advisor with industry 
expertise on accounting 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the acquirer advisor is an accounting firm whose 
parent audit firm has expertise as an audit-specialist of the target’s industry and 0 
otherwise. An industry audit-specialist is defined analogously according to the 
largest-industry-market-share definition in Lim and Tan (2008) and Mayhew and 
Wilkins (2003), with the market shares by audit clients’ total assets substituting for 
the market shares by audit clients’ sales revenues in the original definition. We 
calculate the measure each year for each target market.     
Percentage of shares sought  The percentage of target shares the bidder seeks to acquire (1 = 100%).  
Hostile deal An indicator variable equal to 1 if the board officially rejects the offer but the 
acquirer persists with the takeover and 0 otherwise. 
Competed deal An indicator variable equal to 1 if a third party launched an offer for the target while 
the original bid was pending and 0 otherwise. 
Domestic An indicator variable equal to 1 if the target is incorporated in the same country as the 
acquirer and 0 otherwise. 
Financing required An indicator variable equal to 1 if the source of funding for the transaction is either 
borrowing, bridge loan, common stock issue, debt issue, junk bond issue, mezzanine 
financing, rights issue, staple offering, or preferred stock, and 0 otherwise.  
Number of considerations 
offered 
The number of securities used in the payment for target stock. 
Cash offering An indicator variable equal to 1 if the transaction payment method is cash and 0 
otherwise. 
Number of acquirer 
advisors 
The number of financial advisors advising the acquirer in the M&A deal. 
Returning acquirer advisor An indicator variable equal to 1 if the acquirer advisors advised the acquirer in a prior 
M&A deal and 0 otherwise. We search for past M&A transactions over a three-year 
period. 
Intra-industry merger An indicator variable equal to 1 if the acquirer and the target are in the same industry 
based on Kenneth French 10 industry classifications and 0 otherwise. 
Offer premium The ratio of the bid price per share to the target’s closing stock price 1 day prior to 
announcement less 1. The ratio is expressed in percentage.  
Top IB  An indicator variable equal to 1 for top-tier investment banks using the classification 
from Fang (2005) and Golubov et al. (2012) and 0 otherwise.  
Advisor is industry 
specialist 
An indicator variable equal to 1 for whether the advisor completed the most M&A 
transactions in the target’s industry over the previous three years and 0 otherwise. 
Industry effects Acquirer's industry dummy variables based on the two-digit SIC code.    
Year effects Year dummy variables for the M&A deal announcement year. 
Acquirer characteristics 
 
Acquirer size  Acquirer's market capitalization measured at the end of the fiscal year before the 
M&A deal date and expressed in USD millions using the exchange rate at the end of 
the month preceding the transaction. 
Acquirer B/M Acquirer's book value of equity to market value of equity ratio at the fiscal year end 
(FYE) prior to the M&A deal. 
Acquirer leverage Acquirer's ratio of long-term debt to average assets at the FYE prior to the M&A 
deal. 
Acquirer stock momentum Acquirer's buy-and-hold stock returns for 90-days prior to the previous FYE. 
Acquirer stock volatility Stock price standard deviation measured over 90-days before the previous FYE, 
scaled by the mean price level over this period.   
IFRS acquirer An indicator variable equal to 1 if the acquirer reports under IFRS and 0 otherwise. 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
Target characteristics 
 
Family owned target An indicator variable equal to 1 if a family or group of families controls at least 20% 
of the target and 0 otherwise. 
IFRS target An indicator variable equal to 1 if the target reports under IFRS and 0 otherwise. 
Target B/M Target’s book value of equity to market value of equity ratio at the FYE prior to the 
M&A deal. 
Target earnings volatility Target’s earnings volatility measured over the 4 years prior to the M&A. 
Target in capital city An indicator variable equal to 1 if the target’s headquarter is in the capital and 0 
otherwise.  
Targets’ CARs Targets’ CARs (−2, 2) calculated around the deal announcement. 
Country characteristics (Acquirer) 
Common law  An indicator variable equal to 1 if the legal system of the bidder country originates 
from the UK common law system and 0 otherwise.  
Ownership concentration Ownership concentration index of the acquirer's country of incorporation, which is 
the median proportion of common shares owned by the three largest shareholders in 
the ten largest privately owned nonfinancial firms. 
High disclosure regulation A measure for the bidder country based on the country disclosure score from Hope 
(2003). The higher the score, the higher the quality of the disclosure regulation in the 
country.  
Aggregate earnings 
management  
An aggregate score of the earnings management activities of the nonfinancial firms 
in the acquirer's country of incorporation.  
Country characteristics (Target) 
More aggregate earnings 
management 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the target country’s aggregate earnings 
management score is higher than that of the bidder country and 0 otherwise. The 
score is from Leuz et al. (2003).  
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics         
    This table presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used for analysis. All variables are defined in table 1.  
 (1) (2) (1) - (2) 
 Accounting firm acquirer advisor          
(N = 758) 
Investment bank acquirer advisor              
(N =8,544) 
Difference in mean 
Variable Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. % diff. t/z 
A. Valuation uncertainty 
        
Target in low AQ industry 0.045 0.000 0.207 0.032 0.000 0.177 39.4% 144.23 
Private target 0.418 0.000 0.494 0.179 0.000 0.384 133.2% 210.56 
Non-US target 0.885 1.000 0.319 0.819 1.000 0.385 8.1% 16.71 
Deal value 303 46 950 2015 379 4692 −85.0% −0.02 
Deal value / Acquirer size 0.457 0.066 1.652 0.568 0.152 1.491 −19.6% −8.84 
B. Deal value, financing, and method of payment        
Financing required 0.157 0.000 0.364 0.234 0.000 0.423 −32.8% −60.62 
Cash offering 0.410 0.000 0.492 0.418 0.000 0.493 −1.8% −2.55 
Number of considerations offered 1.423 1.000 0.681 1.458 1.000 0.732 −2.4% −2.44 
C. Past relation with the advisor         
Returning acquirer advisor 0.325 0.000 0.469 0.488 0.000 0.500 −33.5% −50.00 
D. Other deal characteristics         
Percentage of shares sought 90.103 100.000 22.360 84.304 100.000 27.246 6.9% 0.20 
Number of acquirer advisors 1.516 1.000 0.888 1.846 1.000 1.199 −17.9% −12.56 
Hostile deal 0.003 0.000 0.051 0.022 0.000 0.148 −88.3% −627.95 
Competed deal 0.001 0.000 0.036 0.052 0.000 0.221 −97.4% −495.37 
Domestic 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.420 0.000 0.494 19.1% 27.48 
Family owned target  0.003 0.000 0.051 0.005 0.000 0.073 −51.0% −601.82 
 
 
 
 
 
 (continued on next page) 
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Table 2 (continued)                 
 
 (1)   (2)  (1) - (2) 
 Accounting firm acquirer advisor          
(N = 843) 
Investment bank acquirer advisor           
(N = 13,212) 
Difference in mean 
Variable Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. % diff. t/z 
E. Acquirer characteristics 
        
Acquirer size  4681 850 8450 8894 3534 11090 −47.4% 0.00 
Acquirer B/M 0.690 0.486 0.726 0.686 0.491 0.845 0.7% 0.64 
Acquirer leverage 0.163 0.137 0.159 0.183 0.150 0.159 −11.0% −49.53 
Acquirer stock momentum 0.110 0.053 0.372 0.127 0.072 0.401 −13.1% −24.54 
Acquirer stock volatility 0.108 0.061 0.156 0.121 0.055 0.194 −10.9% −45.46 
F. Country characteristics (Acquirer)         
Common law  0.509 1.000 0.500 0.390 0.000 0.488 30.6% 44.28 
Ownership concentration 0.284 0.150 0.163 0.302 0.240 0.161 −5.9% −25.95 
High disclosure regulation 0.696 0.833 0.160 0.684 0.750 0.156 1.7% 7.79 
Aggregate earnings management  11.996 7.000 6.605 13.161 13.500 6.584 −8.9% −0.96 
G. Country characteristics (Target) 
      
  
More aggregate earnings management  0.172 0.000 0.377 0.161 0.000 0.367 0.066 12.77 
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Table 3 Type of advisor chosen by acquirers: accounting-firm vs. investment-bank advisor 
    The table reports the results of the advisor choice analysis for the acquirer. The dependent variable AF advisor 
takes the value of 1 if the acquirer has chosen an accounting firm advisor in the M&A deal, and 0 otherwise. The 
explanatory variables are defined in table 1. ln denotes the logarithm value of a variable and N is the number of 
observations. p(Wald Χ2) is the p-value of the Wald Χ2-test for model specification. Pseudo R2 is the pseudo R-
squared.  
 (1) (2) 
 Baseline Full model 
  Estimate p Estimate % change in odds 
p 
Panel A: Regression results      
Intercept −1.066 0.006 −1.076  0.031 
Target in low AQ industry 0.702 0.042 0.722 105.90 0.064 
Private target 0.501 0.000 0.452 57.20 0.000 
Non-US target 0.318 0.010 0.347 41.40 0.013 
ln Deal value −0.038 0.723 −0.494 −39.00 0.000 
Financing required −0.152 0.327 −0.109 −10.30 0.456 
Cash offering 0.005 0.952 −0.044 −4.30 0.582 
Number of considerations offered −0.054 0.424 −0.042 −4.10 0.546 
Returning acquirer advisor −0.360 0.003 −0.363 −30.40 0.002 
Percentage of shares sought 0.012 0.000 0.012 1.20 0.000 
Number of acquirer advisors 0.198 0.000 0.175 19.10 0.002 
Hostile deal −0.621 0.236 −0.502 −39.50 0.295 
Competed deal −2.906 0.006 −2.876 −94.40 0.003 
Domestic −0.482 0.000 −0.065 −6.30 0.549 
Family owned target  −0.733 0.149 −0.469 −37.50 0.487 
ln Acquirer size  0.058 0.192 0.063 6.50 0.157 
ln Acquirer B/M 0.070 0.145 0.064 6.60 0.202 
ln Acquirer leverage 0.105 0.569 0.021 2.10 0.926 
Acquirer stock momentum 0.130 0.546 0.148 15.90 0.540 
Acquirer stock volatility −0.141 0.466 −0.137 −12.80 0.538 
Country characteristics (Acquirer):      
    Common law  0.796 0.000 0.837 130.90 0.000 
    Ownership concentration 1.385 0.248 1.531 362.30 0.174 
    High disclosure regulation −2.191 0.001 −2.033 −86.90 0.002 
    Aggregate earnings management  −0.009 0.763 −0.011 −1.10 0.720 
Country characteristics (Target):      
    More aggregate earnings management  0.094 0.399 0.115 12.20 0.274 
Year and industry effects No  Yes   
N 9302  9302   
p(Wald X2) 0.000  0.000   
Pseudo R2 18.69%  21.20%    
 
 
 
 
 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Additional results (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  AQ recalculated at the country level High R&D targets 
Index measure for 
valuation uncertainty Target-level controls 
  Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p 
Intercept −0.272 0.774 −1.096 0.027 −1.839 0.000 −33.879 0.000 
Target in low AQ industry at the country level 0.490 0.001       
Target in high R&D industry   0.149 0.010     
Target low reporting quality index     0.790 0.000   
Target qualified opinion       11.964 0.000 
Target low AQ        4.197 0.008 
Target loss       0.202 0.676 
Target B/M       0.249 0.442 
Target in low AQ industry   0.741 0.059 0.601 0.128 3.666 0.183 
Private target 0.360 0.022 0.453 0.000 −0.010 0.930   
Non-US target   0.359 0.011 0.154 0.292 9.343 0.000 
ln Deal value −0.484 0.000 −0.495 0.000 −0.389 0.000 −0.725 0.000 
Deal controls Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  
Acquirer firm controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Acquirer country controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 5854  9302  9302  1060  
p(Wald X2) 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Pseudo R2 20.21%  21.23%  21.51%  37.15%  
 
  
 50 
 
Table 4 Acquirer announcement-period CAR 
    Panel A reports the average acquirer CARs partitioned by the accounting firm and investment bank advised deals. 
Panel B shows the main regression results of acquirer announcement returns. Panels C, D, and E report additional 
regression results concerning accounting firm characteristics, target’s reporting quality, and investment bank 
specialization. Panel F reports regressions that address endogeneity concerns. The dependent variable is the acquirer 
CAR calculated for the five days (−2, 2) around the announcement (day 0) of an acquisition deal, adjusted for the 
market return based on the stock market index of the acquirer's country of incorporation. Controls are the same as in 
equation (1). The other explanatory variables are defined in table 1. ln denotes the logarithm value of a variable and 
N is the number of observations. F is the F-statistic for the model specification and p(F) is the corresponding p-
value. R2 is the R-squared. Model 1 of panel F uses IV estimation to control for the endogeneity of the AF acquirer 
advisor variable. Model 2 of panel F is based on the paired sample matched by the propensity score.  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics N Mean S.E. t 
Full sample:     
Accounting firm advisor 691 2.02% 0.32% 6.40 
Investment bank advisor 7771 0.92% 0.08% 11.78 
% diff.  118.4% 0.32% 3.37 
Panel B: Main regression results (1) (2) (3) 
  Baseline Full model AQ recalculated at the country level 
 Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p 
Intercept 0.055 0.027 0.053 0.031 0.060 0.035 
AF advisor 0.004 0.075 0.005 0.017 0.006 0.047 
AF advisor with industry expertise on accounting   −0.010 0.279 −0.007 0.523 
AF advisor with industry expertise on accounting   
  × Target in low AQ industry 
  0.100 0.058   
Target in low AQ industry −0.006 0.089 −0.008 0.053   
AF advisor with industry expertise on accounting   
  × Target in low AQ industry at country level     0.029 0.012 
Target in low AQ industry at country level     −0.011 0.110 
Deal controls Yes  Yes  Yes  
Acquirer firm controls Yes  Yes  Yes  
Acquirer country controls Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 8462  8462  5377  
p(F) 0.000  0.000  0.000  
R2 6.51%  6.73%  8.13%  
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Table 4 (continued) 
Panel C: Accounting firm characteristics (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Big 4  AF advisor 
AF advisor is  
target auditor 
AF advisor is 
acquirer auditor Due diligence 
Target in the 
capital city 
 Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p 
Intercept 0.053 0.031 0.045 0.049 0.054 0.025 0.106 0.060 0.046 0.070 
AF advisor 0.004 0.018 0.006 0.143 0.003 0.182 0.006 0.388 0.005 0.021 
AF advisor with industry expertise on accounting −0.010 0.284   −0.007 0.479   −0.012 0.200 
AF advisor with industry expertise on accounting  
  × Target in low AQ industry 0.096 0.081   
0.042 0.008   0.098 0.061 
Target in low AQ industry −0.010 0.043 −0.007 0.047 0.003 0.576 −0.011 0.528 −0.005 0.217 
Big 4 −0.005 0.494         
Big 4 × Target in low AQ industry 0.037 0.016         
AF advisor is target auditor   −0.001 0.810       
AF advisor is target auditor × Target in low AQ industry   0.027 0.051       
AF advisor is acquirer auditor     −0.001 0.931     
AF advisor is acquirer auditor  
  × Intra industry merger × Target in low AQ industry 
  
  
0.050 0.002 
    
Intra industry merger × Target in low AQ industry     −0.013 0.027     
AF advisor is acquirer auditor 
  × Intra industry merger 
  
  0.006 0.611     
AF advisor is acquiror auditor × Target in low AQ 
  
    0.010 0.271     
Intra industry merger     −0.001 0.556     
Due diligence by advisor       −0.152 0.000   
AF advisor × Due diligence by advisor       0.144 0.000   
AF advisor × Due diligence by advisor  
  × Target in low AQ industry   
    
0.066 0.007 
  
Target in capital city         −0.003 0.180 
AF advisor × Target in capital city         0.009 0.052 
Deal controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Acquirer firm controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Acquirer country controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year and industry effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 8462  6436  8451  701  6934  
p(F) 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
R2 6.79%  7.84%  6.67%  40.94%  7.82%  
(continued on next page) 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Panel D: Target’s reporting quality and 
announcement day return  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Index Index2 Target qualified opinion Target CAR 
 Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p 
Intercept 0.058 0.006 0.061 0.148 0.020 0.609 0.086 0.860 
AF advisor −0.003 0.529 −0.033 0.019 −0.060 0.000 −0.027 0.000 
AF advisor × Target reporting quality index 0.012 0.098       
Target reporting quality index −0.007 0.397       
AF advisor × Target reporting quality index2   0.130 0.004     
Target reporting quality index2   −0.009 0.455     
Target earnings volatility   0.006 0.866    
 
AF advisor × Target qualified audit opinion     0.069 0.000   
Target qualified audit opinion     −0.003 0.568   
Deal controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Acquirer firm controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Acquirer country controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year and industry effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 8462  999  2724  1056  
p(F) 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
R2 6.58%  5.70%  13.49%  34.19%  
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Table 4 (continued) 
Panel E: Advisory team/advisor characteristics (1) (2) (3) 
 Single advisor Advisory specialization  Team characteristics 
  Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p 
Intercept 0.037 0.204 0.053 0.030 0.054 0.029 
AF advisor 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.017 0.003 0.117 
AF advisor with industry expertise on accounting −0.008 0.221 −0.010 0.275   
AF advisor with industry expertise on accounting    
  × Target in low AQ industry 0.035 0.005 0.100 0.077 
  
Target in low AQ industry −0.004 0.371 −0.008 0.210 0.010 0.119 
Top IB   0.001 0.360 0.001 0.385 
Top IB × Target in low AQ industry   0.001 0.936   
Advisor is industry specialist   0.000 0.923   
Advisor is industry specialist   
  × Target in low AQ industry 
  −0.013 0.426 
  
Number of acquirer advisors      −0.002 0.234 
Number of acquirer advisors  
  × Target in low AQ industry 
    −0.015 0.007 
Number of acquirer advisors   
  × Target in low AQ industry × Top IB  
    0.004 0.434 
Number of acquirer advisors  
  × Target in low AQ industry × AF advisor 
    0.025 0.037 
Deal controls Yes  Yes  Yes  
Acquirer firm controls Yes  Yes 
 Yes  
Acquirer country controls Yes  Yes 
 Yes  
Year and industry effects Yes  Yes 
 Yes  
N 4502  8462 
 8462  
p(F) 0.000  0.000 
 0.000  
R2 6.48%   6.75%   6.75%   
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Table 4 (continued) 
Panel F: Endogeneity regressions (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  2SLS PSM IFRS Placebo test 
  Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p 
Intercept 0.035 0.008 0.028 0.348 0.055 0.031 0.034 0.014 
AF advisor 0.093 0.017 0.009 0.069 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.270 
AF advisor with industry expertise on accounting   −0.015 0.009 −0.010 0.285 −0.002 0.826 
AF advisor with industry expertise on accounting   
  × Target in low AQ industry 
  0.118 0.031 0.102 0.044 0.180 0.000 
Target in low AQ industry −0.007 0.079 0.000 0.971 −0.008 0.050 −0.003 0.611 
AF advisor × Acquirer IFRS × Target IFRS     −0.006 0.002   
Acquirer IFRS × Target IFRS     −0.005 0.221   
AF advisor with industry expertise on accounting 
  × Acquirer low AQ 
      −0.028 0.801 
Acquirer low AQ       −0.016 0.310 
Deal controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Acquirer firm controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Acquirer country controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year and industry effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 8462  1382  8462  4661  
p(F) 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
R2 5.72%  9.27%  6.61%  10.31%   
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Table 5 Offer premium    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Panel A reports the average offer premium partitioned by the type of advisor. Panel B shows the offer premium 
regressions. The dependent variable is the offer premium defined as (the ratio of the bid price per share to the target’s 
closing stock price 1 day prior to announcement – 1) × 100. Deal controls are dummy variables for external financing for 
the transaction and returning acquirer advisor, log of deal size, the number of acquirer advisors, and indicators for 
significant family ownership of the target and the termination agreement. Acquirer firm controls are the log values of the 
acquirer size, leverage, and B/M, the acquirer stock momentum and volatility. Acquirer country controls are the country 
characteristics for the acquirer defined in table 1. The other explanatory variables are defined in table 1. N is the number 
of observations. F is the F-statistic for the model specification and p(F) is the corresponding p-value. R2 is the R-
squared.  
Panel A: Descriptive statistics N Mean S.E. t 
Full sample:        
Accounting firm advisor 64 25.46% 2.36% 10.78 
Investment bank advisor 2655 29.56% 0.49% 60.39 
% diff.   −13.88% 2.41% −1.70 
Panel B: Regression results (1) (2) (3) 
 Baseline Industry expertise on accounting PSM 
  Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p 
Intercept 0.312 0.000 0.314 0.000 0.565 0.040 
AF advisor −0.033 0.054 −0.051 0.036 −0.053 0.098 
AF advisor with industry expertise on accounting   0.116 0.076 0.064 0.336 
AF advisor with industry expertise on accounting  
  × Target in low AQ industry   −0.112 0.096 −0.198 0.083 
Target in low AQ industry 0.394 0.000 0.394 0.000 0.041 0.693 
Deal controls Yes  Yes  Yes  
Acquirer firm controls Yes  Yes  Yes  
Acquirer country controls Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year effects Yes  Yes  No  
Industry effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 2719  2719  128  
p(F) 0.000  0.000  0.000  
R2 17.99%   18.06%   44.88%  
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Table 6 Future goodwill impairment likelihood, deal completion rates and future firm profitability 
       Panel A reports the fraction of the combined firms reporting goodwill impairment within five years after the 
transactions as in Fich, Rice, and Tran (2016) for the pooled sample and the PSM sample. Panel B reports the fraction 
of deals with SDC withdrawn status. Panel C reports the mean industry-adjusted future profitability of the combined 
firms measured over five years after the transaction. ROA is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to average 
assets. 
 
Panel A: Future goodwill impairment  N Mean S.E. z 
Full sample:         
Accounting firm advisor 40 55.00% 7.97% 6.90 
Investment bank advisor 1379 74.09% 1.16% 64.07 
% diff.  −25.77% 8.05% −2.37 
PSM sample:     
Accounting firm advisor 40 52.50% 8.00% 6.57 
Investment bank advisor 40 70.97% 5.81% 12.21 
% diff.  −26.02% 9.89% −1.87 
Panel B: Percentage of withdrawn deals N Mean S.E. z 
Full sample:     
Accounting firm advisor 764 0.13% 0.13% 1.00 
Investment bank advisor 8644 7.38% 0.28% 26.24 
% diff.  −98.23% 0.31% −23.37 
PSM sample:     
Accounting firm advisor 764 0.13% 0.13% 1.00 
Investment bank advisor 764 0.87% 0.33% 2.66 
% diff.  −84.97% 0.35% −2.10 
Panel C: Future industry-adjusted ROA N Mean S.E. t 
Full sample:     
Accounting firm advisor 688 −0.12% 0.30% −0.38 
Investment bank advisor 7915 0.01% 0.06% 0.16 
% diff.  −1250.43% 0.31% −0.41 
PSM sample:     
Accounting firm advisor 688 −0.12% 0.30% −0.38 
Investment bank advisor 688 −0.61% 0.33% −1.85 
% diff.  −81.13% 0.45% 1.11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
